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CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS v. EDMOND: AN UNPRECEDENTED USE 
OF “PRIMARY” PURPOSE LEAVES WIDE OPEN THE DOOR FOR 
“SECONDARY” PROBLEMS 
INTRODUCTION 
8.  EVERY VEHICLE BEING STOPPED MUST BE EXAMINED IN 
THE SAME MANNER UNTIL PARTICULARIZED SUSPICION OR 
PROBABLE CAUSE DEVELOPS.  THERE WILL BE NO 
EXCEPTIONS!  A DRUG DETECTION DOG WILL WALK AROUND 
AND EXAMINE EVERY VEHICLE STOPPED AT THE 
CHECKPOINT. 
9.  THERE WILL BE NO DISCRETION GIVEN TO ANY OFFICER TO 
STOP ANY VEHICLE OUT OF SEQUENCE.  WHEN THE 
SEQUENCE OF VEHICLES HAVE (sic) BEEN TOTALLY DEALT 
WITH AND EITHER RELEASED OR SEIZED, THE VERY NEXT 
SEQUENCE OF VEHICLES WILL BE STOPPED.  NO VEHICLES 
WILL BE PERMITTED TO PASS THE CHECKPOINT BEFORE 
ANOTHER SEQUENCE IS STOPPED AFTER ALL VEHICLES IN 
THE CURRENT SEQUENCE HAVE BEEN RELEASED OR SEIZED.1 
 
Six times between August and November of 1998, the Indianapolis Police 
Department set up checkpoints or drug interdiction roadblocks for the sole 
purpose of catching drug offenders and “[interrupting] the flow of illegal 
narcotics throughout Indianapolis.”2  Approximately thirty officers were 
located at each checkpoint, along with patrol cars that contained mobile data 
terminals.3  During each stop, which exceeded no more than five minutes, a 
predetermined number of drivers were asked to present their driver’s licenses 
and vehicle registration, while an officer peered into the car.4  At some point 
during the stop, the police led a drug-sniffing dog around the exterior of the 
 
 1. Edmond v. Goldsmith, 38 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1019 (S.D. Ind. 1998) [hereinafter 
Goldsmith I] (quoting selected portions of the Indianapolis Police Department’s (IPD’s) written 
guidelines for drug interdiction checkpoints). 
 2. Id. at 1018; Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659, 661 (7th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter 
Goldsmith II]. 
 3. Goldsmith I, 38 F. Supp. 2d at 1019.  The purpose of the mobile terminals is to run a 
search on invalid licenses and registrations at the checkpoint location.  Id. 
 4. Id.; Goldsmith II, 183 F.3d at 661. 
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car, and upon an “alert” or indication from the trained dog, probable cause was 
established.5  This program led to the stopping of 1,161 vehicles, which 
resulted in fifty-five drug-related arrests, “meaning that five percent of the total 
number of stops resulted in successful drug ‘hits,’ and 49 arrests for conduct 
unrelated to drugs, such as driving with an expired driver’s license, for an 
overall hit rate of 9 percent.”6  Respondents James Edmond and Joell Palmer, 
who were each stopped at a narcotics checkpoint, filed a class action suit 
against the City of Indianapolis and its Mayor, as well as unknown members of 
the Indianapolis Police Department (hereinafter “State”).  They represented 
“any and all persons driving vehicles who have been stopped or [are] subject to 
being stopped in the future at the drug interdiction roadblocks maintained by 
the City of Indianapolis in an attempt to interdict and curtail unlawful drugs 
and unlawful drug use.”7  The United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Indiana denied Respondents’ motion for preliminary injunction, but 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding 
that the checkpoints “contravened the Fourth Amendment.”8  The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari and affirmed the judgment of the Seventh Circuit.9 
The fundamental principle of the Fourth Amendment requires that searches 
and seizures be reasonable;10 however the Supreme Court has recognized 
limited circumstances where the usual requirement of reasonable suspicion and 
probable cause have been waived.11  To determine whether individualized 
suspicion is required, the Court balances “the nature of the interests threatened 
and their connection to the particular law enforcement practices at issue.”12 
Suspicionless searches have been upheld where the program was designed to 
serve special needs,13 administrative purposes,14 a fixed border patrol 
 
 5. Goldsmith II, 183 F.3d at 661; Goldsmith I, 38 F. Supp. 2d at 1019. 
 6. Goldsmith II, 183 F.3d at 661. 
 7. Goldsmith I, 38 F. Supp. 2d at 1020. 
 8. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 36 (2000). 
 9. Goldsmith II, 183 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 69 U.S.L.W. 4009 (U.S. Feb. 
22, 2000) (No. 99-1030). 
 10. See infra notes 27-35 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text. 
 12. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42-43. 
 13. Id. at 37.  See, e.g., Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).  The 
increased use of drugs, particularly among student athletes, led the school district in Vernonia, 
Oregon, to impose random drug testing of its student-athletes.  Id. at 649.  The Court took into 
account several factors, including “the decreased expectation of privacy, the relative 
unobtrusiveness of the search, and the severity of the need met by the search” and upheld 
Vernonia’s school policy as “reasonable and hence constitutional.”  Id. at 664-65.  The Court 
added: 
We caution against the assumption that suspicionless drug testing will readily pass 
constitutional muster in other contexts.  The most significant factor in this case is . . . that 
the policy was undertaken in furtherance of the government’s responsibilities, under a 
public school system, as guardian and tutor of children entrusted to its care.  Just as when 
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the government conducts a search in its capacity as employer . . . the relevant question is 
whether that intrusion upon privacy is one that a reasonable employer might engage in; so 
also when the government acts as guardian and tutor the relevant question is whether the 
search is one that a reasonable guardian and tutor might undertake.  [W]e conclude in the 
present case it is. 
Id. at 665 (citation omitted). 
  In National Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989), the United States 
Customs Service, largely responsible for seizing contraband, required its own employees seeking 
transfer or promotion to certain positions involving the interdiction of illegal drugs to undergo a 
drug test.  Id. at 659-60, 679.  The Court upheld the suspicionless drug testing of the Service after 
balancing “the public interest in the Service’s testing program against the privacy concerns 
implicated by the test.”  The Court also stated that “the Government’s compelling interests in 
preventing the promotion of drug users to positions where they might endanger the integrity of 
our Nation’s borders or the life of the citizenry outweigh the privacy interest of those who seek 
promotion in these positions . . . .”  Id. at 679. 
  In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989), the Federal 
Railroad Administration (FRA) set forth certain regulations mandating blood and urine tests of 
employees involved in certain train accidents or found to be in violation of particular safety 
regulations.  Id. at 606; Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37.  The Court held that the 
compelling Government interests served by the FRA’s regulations would be significantly 
hindered if railroads were required to point to specific facts giving rise to a reasonable 
suspicion of impairment before testing a given employee.  The necessity to perform that 
regulatory function with respect to railroad employees engaged in safety-sensitive tasks, 
and the reasonableness of the system for doing so, have been established in this case. 
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633. 
 14. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 35-37.  See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702-04 
(1987).  New York City Police Department, Auto Crimes Division, conducted a warrantless 
inspection of a junkyard owner’s premises, in accordance with N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 415-a5 
(McKinney 1986), and determined he was in possession of stolen vehicles and parts.  Burger, 482 
U.S. at 693-95.  The Court upheld the inspection, finding that it fell within the “established 
exception to the warrant requirement for administrative inspection in ‘closely regulated’ 
businesses.”  Id. at 703.  The regulatory scheme satisfied the three criteria to make reasonable 
warrantless inspections pursuant to the statute.  Id. at 708.  First, the State had a “substantial 
interest in regulating the vehicle-dismantling and automobile-junkyard industry” due to increased 
motor vehicle theft in the State, and this theft is associated with the above industry.  Id.  Second, 
the regulation of this industry “reasonably [served] the State’s substantial interest in eradicating 
the automobile theft.”  Id. at 709.  Finally, the statute provided a “constitutionally adequate 
substitute for a warrant.”  Id. at 711 (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 603 (1981)). 
  In Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978), after the fire department stopped a fire in 
Tyler’s Auction furniture store, other members of the department proceeded into the fire-damaged 
premises “to determine the cause and make out all reports.”  Id. at 502.  Two plastic containers of 
flammable liquid had been found in the building, and upon concluding that arson may have been 
the cause of the fire, pictures of the containers and scene were taken, and the actual containers 
were eventually seized by the fire department.  The respondents challenged the introduction of the 
containers at trial, as there was neither consent nor a warrant for any post-fire entry into the 
building nor for the removal of the containers.  Id. at 501.  The Court found that a warrant was 
not necessary for the re-entries because the initial investigation was severely hindered by 
darkness, steam and smoke.  Id. at 511.  The morning re-entries were just a continuation of the 
first, and the “lack of a warrant thus did not invalidate the resulting seizure of evidence.”  Id.  
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checkpoint designed to intercept illegal aliens15 or check driver sobriety,16 and 
the Court even suggested that a similar checkpoint whose purpose was to 
verify drivers’ licenses and vehicle registration might also be permissible.17  
Yet the Court has made it clear that it had never upheld, nor even indicated that 
it might uphold, a checkpoint whose “primary purpose” was to detect general 
criminal wrongdoing.18 
While the Court pointed out another well-established principle—that 
vehicle stops on the highway constitute a seizure within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment—the thrust of its opinion centered around the primary 
purpose of checkpoint programs.19  Rejecting the State’s assertion that 
precedent precluded an inquiry into the purpose of a checkpoint program 
where a legitimate interest is pursued,20 the Court stated that such cases 
reinforce the principle that “programmatic purposes may be relevant to the 
validity of the Fourth Amendment intrusions undertaken pursuant to a general 
scheme without individualized suspicion.”21  In response to the State’s 
argument that its program ought to be justified by its lawful secondary 
purposes of keeping impaired motorists off the road and verifying drivers’ 
licenses and registrations, the Court noted that the importance of examining the 
primary purpose was to prevent the police from establishing checkpoints for 
nearly any purpose “so long as they also included a license or sobriety 
check.”22 
 
“[A]n entry to fight a fire requires no warrant, and . . . once in the building, officials may remain 
there for a reasonable time to investigate the cause of the blaze.  Thereafter, additional entries to 
investigate the cause of the fire must be made pursuant to the warrant procedures governing 
administrative searches.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
  And in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), contrary to the above-cited 
cases, the Court held that the routine annual inspection of an apartment building by an inspector 
of the Division of Housing Inspection did not suggest compelling urgency, thus a warrant should 
be sought if entry is refused.  Id. at 539.  “Since our holding emphasizes the controlling standard 
of reasonableness, nothing we say today is intended to foreclose prompt inspections, even without 
a warrant, that the law has traditionally upheld in emergency situations.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
 15. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
 16. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990). 
 17. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979). 
 18. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 38. 
 19. Id. at 40. 
 20. Petitioners rely on Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1986), and Bond v. United 
States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000), to support the proposition that “where the government articulates 
and pursues a legitimate interest for a suspicionless stop, courts should not look behind that 
interest to determine whether the government’s ‘primary purpose’ is valid.”  Edmond, 531 U.S. at 
45. 
 21. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 45-46 (citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 813). 
 22. Id. at 46.  The Court noted that because the State concedes its primary purpose was to 
intercept narcotics, it need not be decided whether a state may establish a checkpoint whose 
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The Court concluded that its holding did not affect valid border searches or 
those searches conducted at airports and government buildings, where the need 
for such measures to ensure public safety was heightened.23  In addition, the 
ability of police officers to respond to information properly acquired during a 
checkpoint stop, justified by a lawful primary purpose, was not debilitated.24  
Finally, the purpose inquiry was to be conducted only at the programmatic 
level and was not an invitation to “probe the minds of individual officers acting 
at the scene.”25  Because the primary purpose of the Indianapolis checkpoint 
was concededly one of general crime control, it violated the Fourth 
Amendment, and the judgment of the Seventh Circuit was affirmed.26 
This Note will analyze the current state of the law surrounding vehicle 
roadblocks and checkpoints due to the recent Supreme Court case, City of 
Indianapolis v. Edmond.  Part I will provide a summary of the relevant 
principles behind the Fourth Amendment where the courts have upheld 
seizures at roadblock checkpoints without a warrant or probable cause.  Part II 
will provide a brief discussion of the circuit split regarding the legality of 
vehicle roadblocks and Brown v. Texas, which set forth the three-prong test 
governing the reasonableness of seizures.  Part III will critically evaluate City 
of Indianapolis v. Edmond, the recent Supreme Court decision discussing 
vehicle roadblocks and checkpoints, and suggest its departure from Brown v. 
Texas and unprecedented use of a “primary” purpose.  Finally, Part IV will 
conclude with the overall significance and future impact this case will have on 
the current state of law. 
I.  VEHICLE CHECKPOINTS: A UNIQUE EXCEPTION TO THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT 
A. Introduction 
The Fourth Amendment provides, in part, that people have a right to be 
secure against unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrants permitting 
such searches or seizures will be granted absent a showing of probable cause.27  
 
primary purpose is to check for vehicle registration, while its secondary purpose is for general 
criminal law enforcement purposes.  Id. at 47 n.2. 
 23. Id. at 47-48. 
 24. Id. at 48. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48. 
 27. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  Because the Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable 
searches and seizures, it follows that government activity must first rise to the level of a “search” 
or “seizure” to be subject to the Fourth Amendment and the reasonable criterion.  Reasonable 
searches and seizures are not subject to the Fourth Amendment.  See generally STEPHEN A. 
SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES AND COMMENTARY 
33 (5th ed. 1986). 
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While judicial developments have determined what constitutes a reasonable 
search and seizure,28 they have also determined what types of government 
activity rise to the level of a search or seizure.29 
 
 28. “Search” is commonly defined by the “reasonable expectation” test fashioned in Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  In Katz, the District Court for the Southern District of 
California convicted petitioner on an eight-count indictment charging him with transmitting 
wagering information by telephone from Los Angeles to Miami and Boston, in violation of a 
federal statute.  Id. at 348.  While the Katz majority held that the government’s activities 
constituted a “search and seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, it was Justice 
Harlan’s concurrence that established the modern test to determine reasonable expectation of 
privacy.  Id. at 360-61.  Courts use this two-pronged test to determine whether government 
conduct constitutes a search.  First, it must be shown that a person exhibits an actual, subjective 
expectation of privacy, and second, that the expectation is one that society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable.  Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).  Government conduct does not rise to 
the level of a search if either prong is lacking.  See JOSHUA  DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE  88 (2d ed. 1997).  Because Harlan’s subjective prong was severely 
criticized, Harlan ultimately concluded that the objective expectation prong should surpass the 
subjective expectation, as “[o]ur expectations, and the risks we assume, are in large part 
reflections of laws that translate into [the] rules[,] customs and values of the past and present.”  
Id. at 89. 
  In the landmark case, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1959), the Court first defined “seizure” 
of a person.  Terry was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon that was discovered after 
Officer McFadden patted down the outside of his clothing, fearing that he might have a gun.  Id. 
at 6-7.  Commonly known as a Terry stop, the Court stated, “whenever a police officer accosts an 
individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has ‘seized’ that person.”  Id. at 16.  
Moreover, the Court established a two-pronged test for determining the reasonableness of a 
seizure: (1) whether the officer’s actions were justified at the time of the event, and (2) whether it 
was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances, which justified the interference in the first 
place.  Id. at 19-20.  The first prong, which later becomes a relevant focus in roadblock cases, 
focuses on governmental interest that justifies such an intrusion upon the private citizen’s 
constitutionally protected interests, for there is “no ready test for determining reasonableness 
other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or 
seizure] entails.”  Id. at 20-21 (citing Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523,  534-35, 536-37 
(1967)).  In justifying, the officer must be able to point to “specific and articulable” facts which, 
combined with rational inferences, reasonably warrant that intrusion—simple good faith is not 
enough.  Id. at 21-22 (footnote omitted). 
  In United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), the Court further developed the status of 
seizures of personal property, considering them unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment 
without a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause.  Id. at 701.  Here, Place was approached 
by law enforcement officers at Miami International Airport, as well as authorities in New York 
LaGuardia Airport, after they were aroused by his suspicious behavior.  The New York federal 
narcotics agents asked to search his luggage, to which he refused, and they notified him they 
would take the luggage to a federal judge to obtain a search warrant.  Place’s bags were 
eventually taken to Kennedy Airport where they were subjected to a “sniff test” by a trained 
narcotics detention dog.  The dog alerted to the smaller of the two bags where the agents 
discovered 1,125 grams of cocaine.  Place was eventually indicted for possession of cocaine with 
the intent to distribute, to which he replied that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the 
warrantless seizure of his luggage.  Applying Terry, the Eastern District of New York stated that 
seizure of the luggage could only be justified if it was based on reasonable suspicion to believe 
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The actual text of the Fourth Amendment can be divided into two general 
parts: the reasonableness clause and the warrant clause, respectively.  The first 
depicts what the amendment seeks to prohibit, or what rights citizens hold 
against the government, and the second states what is required before a warrant 
may be properly issued.30  Probable cause, found within the warrant clause, is 
defined as the “minimum showing necessary to support a warrant 
 
that the bags contained narcotics, and as such existed, Place’s Fourth Amendment rights were not 
violated.  Id. at 698-700.  The Supreme Court stated that Terry allowed seizures based on 
reasonable and articulable suspicion, premised on objective facts, and that the exclusion of the 
probable cause requirement, or articulable suspicion, was justified by balancing the nature and 
quality of the intrusion of the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the governmental 
interests.  Id. at 702-03.  Place argued that a general interest in law enforcement (versus a special 
interest) cannot justify an intrusion on one’s Fourth Amendment right.  Id. at 703-04.  He also 
argued that the Terry stop is inapplicable to the investigative detentions of property because the 
exclusion is premised on the underlying principle that such a stop is less intrusive to a person’s 
liberty than a formal arrest, and as to property, there are no degrees of intrusion; therefore once 
the property is seized, dispossession is absolute.  Id. at 705.  To this the Court responded that 
detentions of property can also vary in their intrusiveness, as such seizures may come after a 
person has “relinquished control of the property to a third party” or “police may [simply] confine 
their investigation to an on-the-spot inquiry.”  Id. at 705-06.  The Court ultimately held that the 
principles of Terry applied to allow an officer, who reasonably believes a traveler to be 
transporting narcotics, to detain the luggage and briefly investigate the circumstances that arouse 
his suspicion, provided the investigation is properly limited in scope.  Id. at 706. 
  Finally, the Court in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), added one more 
prong to the seizure definition.  A person has been “seized” if, in view of all of the circumstances 
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was not free to 
leave.  Id. at 554.  Here, when federal drug agents approached the defendant in an airport, 
identified themselves, and asked to see her identification and ticket, she handed it to the officers.  
Id. at 547-48.  The Court held that such actions of the agents did not constitute a seizure because 
nothing suggested that the defendant had any objective reason to believe that she was not free to 
walk away.  Id. at 555. 
[This conclusion] is not affected by the fact that the respondent was not expressly told by 
the agents that she was free to decline to cooperate with their inquiry, for the 
voluntariness of her responses does not depend upon her having been so informed.  We 
also reject the argument that the only inference to be drawn from the fact that the 
respondent acted in a manner contrary to her self-interest is that she was compelled to 
answer the agents’ questions.  It may happen that a person makes statements to law 
enforcement officials that he later regrets, but the issue in such cases is not whether the 
statement was self-protective, but rather whether it was made voluntarily. 
Id. at 555-56 (citation omitted). 
 29. Implicating the principles laid out in Katz, namely that the Fourth Amendment protects 
people from unreasonable intrusions into their legitimate privacy expectations, and further having 
affirmed that a person does in fact possess a privacy interest in their personalty, one of the 
signature propositions to emerge from Place, which becomes relevant in the principle case, is that 
information obtained through a dog sniff is less intrusive than a typical search, and a “sniff” does 
not rise to the level of a “search” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.  Place, 462 U.S. at 707.  
The Court acknowledged that the agents did in fact “seize” Place’s luggage.  Id. 
 30. DRESSLER, supra note 28, at 69. 
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application,”31 the substance of which is a reasonable ground for belief of 
guilt.32  Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the 
officer’s knowledge, relying on reasonably trustworthy information, are 
sufficient to make a man of reasonable caution believe that an offense has been 
or is being committed.33  Essentially, it is the threshold proof requirement of 
the Fourth Amendment—the higher it is set, the greater the role becomes for 
the judge in sustaining warrants and protecting the public against police 
searches and seizures.34 
The most fundamental principle remains that only those search and 
seizures that are unreasonable are prohibited.  Searches and seizures are 
presumed to be unreasonable unless carried out pursuant to a warrant, and such 
a warrant must be based upon probable cause.35  However, the Supreme Court, 
in a variety of circumstances, has carved out instances where a search or 
seizure may fall within a special needs category beyond what is normal for law 
enforcement, making either or both the warrant and probable cause 
requirements impracticable.36  These exclusions relate primarily to the areas of: 
(1) administrative searches,37 (2) searches of individuals pursuant to “special 
 
 31. SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 27, at 33. 
 32. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (citing McCarthy v. DeArmit, 99 
Pa. 63, 69 (1881)). 
 33. Id. at 175-76 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). 
 34. SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 27, at 73.  For further information concerning 
probable cause, see generally DRESSLER, supra note 28, ch. 9.  See also Spinelli v. United States, 
393 U.S. 410 (1969) and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), which marked the beginning of 
“probable cause” gaining judicial attention.  SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 27, at 73. 
 35. SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 27, at 33. 
 36. DRESSLER, supra note 28, at 279 (alterations in original) (footnote omitted). 
 37. These judicially fashioned exclusions began with Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 
(1959), and the companion cases Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), and See v. 
City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), where the Court took its first step away from the traditional 
notion of “probable cause” and replaced it with a “reasonableness” standard.  DRESSLER, supra 
note 28, at 280-81.  The facts mirror each other in all three cases.  Plaintiffs—a homeowner in 
Frank, lessee of a ground floor apartment in Camara, and a warehouse owner in See—refused to 
permit a city inspection of their premises without a search warrant and argued that such a 
warrantless inspection violated their Fourth Amendment rights.  See Camara, 387 U.S. at 525-26; 
See, 387 U.S. at 541-42; Frank, 359 U.S. at 361.  Even though the result was the same, the 
rationale of Camara and See (decided the same day) essentially overruled that of Frank.  The 
Frank Court has been interpreted as carving out an administrative exclusion to the traditional rule 
that warrantless searches are unreasonable.  Camara, 387 U.S. at 529. 
[M]unicipal fire, health, and housing inspection programs ‘touch at most upon the 
periphery of the important interest safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
protection against official intrusion’ because the inspections are merely to determine 
whether physical conditions exist which do not comply with minimum standards 
prescribed in local regulatory ordinances.  Since the inspector does not ask that the 
property owner open his doors to a search for ‘evidence of criminal action’ which may be 
used to secure the owner’s criminal conviction, historic interests of ‘self-protection’ 
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needs”38 and (3) roadblocks or vehicle checkpoints.39  The first two exclusions, 
as evidenced by their names, relate to searches and focus on the primary 
 
jointly protected by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments are said not to be involved, but 
only the less intense ‘right to be secure from intrusion into personal privacy.’ 
Id. at 530 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).  Camara and See agree that routine inspections of 
a physical condition are less intrusive; nevertheless they depart company with Frank which 
asserts that such Fourth Amendment interests are merely peripheral.  Id.; See, 387 U.S. at 542 
(“find[ing] the principles enunciated in the Camara opinion applicable [in See]”).  As searches 
pursuant to criminal investigations have as their base specific items they may be trying to recover, 
civil inspection programs are aimed at securing a citywide compliance with a particular provision.  
Camara, 387 U.S. at 535.  The normative standard in the former is that there is “probable cause” 
to issue a warrant, but in the latter, the Court reasoned that the particular inspection must simply 
be “reasonable.”  Id. 
  There is a unanimous agreement among those most familiar with this field that the only 
effective way to seek universal compliance with the minimum standards required by municipal 
codes is through routine periodic inspections of all structures.  It is here that the probable cause 
debate is focused, for the agency’s decision to conduct an area inspection is unavoidably based on 
its appraisal of conditions in the area as a whole, not on its knowledge of conditions in each 
particular building.  Id. at 535-36.  Essentially, Camara and See developed an administrative 
search version of “probable cause” that does not require the type of individualized suspicion that 
plays a role in probable cause.  Except in the event of an emergency, such a search must be 
“reasonable,” a term defined by balancing the “need to search against the invasion with the search 
entails.”  Id. at 537; DRESSLER, supra note 28, at 281.  This same balancing test was used one 
year later in Terry.  See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
  Since See, a three-part test has developed which spoke to the warrantless and non-
exigent search of a “closely regulated” business.  In New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987), 
the Court held that (1) the regulatory scheme must advance a substantial government interest, (2) 
the inspection must be necessary to further that scheme, and (3) the statute’s inspection program 
must provide a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant, advising the owner of the 
commercial premise that the search is being made pursuant to law with a properly defined scope 
and limiting the discretion of the inspecting officers.  Id. at 702-03. 
 38. Where the “administrative” cases involved “essentially limited, nonpersonal 
investigations, the ‘special needs’ cases are full-fledged searches aimed at discerning evidence of 
individual wrongdoing.”  Jennifer Y. Buffaloe, “Special Needs” And The Fourth Amendment: An 
Exception Poised To Swallow The Warrant Preference Rule, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 529, 
536 (1997).  This category generally includes searches of students and employees in the absence 
of a warrant and probable cause.  In New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S 325 (1985), the Court applied 
the reasonableness balancing test and ruled that public school teachers and administrators may 
search students provided that: (1) there were reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search 
would turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating the law or school rules, and 
(2) the measures adopted in the search reasonably relate to the objective of the search, and are 
“not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the 
infraction.”  Id. at 341.  Here, two female students were caught smoking in the bathroom in 
violation of school rules.  The students were brought before the vice-principal.  When the 
defendant denied that she had been smoking, the administrator demanded her purse, opened it, 
and observed a package of cigarettes.  He removed the cigarettes, and in doing so discovered 
cigarette paper, which is often used to make marijuana cigarettes.  Based on that observation, he 
conducted a full search of the defendant’s purse, during which he found other evidence that 
implicated her in the sale of marijuana.  The evidence was handed over to the police and used in a 
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purpose.  However, in the final exclusion, characterized primarily as a 
“seizure,” the pressing difficulty is whether the same purpose inquiry is 
equally relevant.  As discussed below in the Edmond dissent, the emphasis on 
 
juvenile court proceeding against her.  Id. at 328-29.  The Court determined that the normal 
warrant and probable cause requirements would frustrate “the swift and informal disciplinary 
procedures” necessary in schools, and the standard that would govern the legality of this search 
would be one based on reasonableness, “spar[ing] teachers and school administrators the 
necessity of schooling themselves in the necessities of probable cause and permit them to regulate 
conduct according to reason and common sense.”  Id. at 340, 343; Buffaloe, supra, at 536.  The 
“special need” language is found in Justice Blackmun’s concurrence, where he echoes the 
sentiment of the Court: 
The Court correctly states that we have recognized limited exceptions to the probable-
cause requirement ‘[w]here a careful balancing of governmental and private interests 
suggest that the public interest is best served’ by a lesser standard.  [W]e have used such a 
balancing test . . . only when we were confronted with ‘a special law enforcement need 
for greater flexibility.’ 
 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (alterations in original) (citation omitted).  
The Court went on to state: 
Education ‘is perhaps the most important function’ of government, and government has a 
heightened obligation to safeguard students whom it compels to attend school.  The 
special need for an immediate response to behavior that threatens either the safety of 
schoolchildren and teachers or the educational process itself justifies the Court in 
excepting school searches from the warrant and probable-cause requirement, and in 
applying a standard determined by balancing the relevant interests. 
Id. at 353 (emphasis added). 
  The Court did away with the notion of individualized suspicion in two companion cases, 
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989), and National Treasury 
Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989), as well as in Vernonia School District 47J v. 
Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).  Skinner and Von Raab concerned mandatory urinalyses test for 
employees, based on a triggering event—a train accident in Skinner and application for 
employment in Von Raab.  In justifying its departure from warrants and probable cause, the Court 
said there was a “special need in regulating the conduct of railroad employees to ensure safety,” 
and a special governmental need to dissuade those persons eligible for sensitive positions from 
drugs.  Buffaloe, supra, at 539-40.  Yet, in Acton, there is an even further departure from 
individualized suspicion.  In desperation of curbing a disciplinary problem in its student athletes, 
the School District instituted a policy of random drug testing, the authorization form for which 
the defendant’s parents refused to sign, consequently banning him from the school football team.  
Acton, 515 U.S. at 650-51.  The Court considered “the decreased expectation of privacy [of 
student athletes], the relative unobtrusiveness of the search and the severity of the need met,” and 
upheld this suspicionless random urinalyses test as reasonable and therefore constitutional.  Id. at 
664-65.  For an in-depth discussion on the “special needs” exception, see generally Buffaloe, 
supra (arguing that this exception is so broad and far-reaching that it turns the warrant 
requirement on its head) and Loree L. French, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n and 
the Fourth Amendment Warrant-Probable Cause Requirement: Special Needs Exception 
Creating a Shakedown Inspection, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 117, 126-39 (1990). 
 39. DRESSLER, supra note 28, at 280-300; SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 27, at 299; 4 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.6, at 
307 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter Treatise I]. 
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“purpose” in the search analysis is due to the traditional notions of privacy one 
can expect to have in their own home; whereas, this same notion of privacy 
expectation is not usually present in the seizure analysis of one’s automobile 
on a public highway. 
B. Vehicle Checkpoints: Uncertain Reliance on “Purpose” 
The most relevant exception with which this Note is concerned is the 
vehicle checkpoint, also known as a roadblock stop.  Law enforcement 
personnel utilize vehicle checkpoints as a primary means of enforcing vehicle 
regulations on the highway.  Checkpoints have been maintained to verify 
driver’s license and registration, inspect vehicles in accordance with safety 
standards, check driver sobriety, weigh and check truck cargo and identify 
those vehicles transporting illegal aliens.40  A common thread woven into each 
of these vehicle stops is that they are “suspicionless.”  In other words, the very 
establishment of the checkpoint program is to prevent or check the mere 
possibility that one may be drunk, have an expired or invalid driver’s license or 
registration, or be attempting to smuggle aliens across the border.  The notion 
of probable cause or individualized suspicion, therefore, is immaterial; rather 
the essence of the stop is one of a legitimate public interest.41 
1. Supreme Court Roadblock Case #1: United States v. Martinez-Fuerte 
The first of two leading Supreme Court cases to discuss seizures pursuant 
to roadblocks is United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, in which several 
respondents, including Martinez-Fuerte, were charged with counts of illegally 
transporting Mexican aliens across the border.42  Each respondent brought 
motions to suppress the evidence on the ground that the operation of the 
checkpoint was in violation of the Fourth Amendment.43  The United States 
District Court for the Southern District of California denied Martinez-Fuerte’s 
motion to suppress, but granted similar motions in two other cases.44  
Martinez-Fuerte appealed his conviction, and the Government appealed the 
granting of the motions in the other respective cases.45  The Ninth Circuit 
consolidated all three appeals, and ultimately reversed Martinez-Fuerte’s 
conviction, and affirmed the orders to suppress in the other cases.46  The Court, 
 
 40. See Treatise I, supra note 39, at 307.  See also discussion infra Part B. 
 41. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 562. 
 42. Id. at 547-49 (citing United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 893 (1975)) (concerning a 
checkpoint located on Interstate 5 near San Clemente, California, 66 miles north of the Mexican 
border). 
 43. Id. at 548. 
 44. Id. at 549. The prosecution of Martinez-Fuerte was before a different District Judge than 
in the other cases.  Id. at 549 n.4. 
 45. Id. at 549. 
 46. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 549. 
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in a 7-2 decision, affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit, which had affirmed the conviction of one respondent, and reversed and 
remanded the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, with 
directions to affirm the conviction of Martinez-Fuerte and to remand the other 
cases to the District Court for further proceedings.47 
The Court began its analysis in Martinez-Fuerte by recognizing the 
national policy of the United States to limit the influx of immigration by way 
of permanent, temporary and roving checkpoints set up by the Border Patrol.48  
It is established that checkpoint stops are “seizures” within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment, yet respondents argued that such routine vehicle stops 
were invalid in the absence of reasonable suspicion and, in the alternative, that 
“routine checkpoint stops are permissible only when the practice has the 
advance judicial authorization of a warrant.”49 
In viewing the substance of the analysis to rest upon balancing the interests 
at stake, the Court concluded that routine stops do not intrude upon one’s 
privacy in the same manner as the inspection of one’s home would,50 because 
the stops involve only a brief detention, and an appreciably less-likely creation 
of fear or concern.51  Moreover, it added that a prerequisite of reasonable 
suspicion to vehicle stops would be impracticable given that the heavy flow of 
traffic would make it virtually impossible to allow for the “particularized study 
of any given car as a possible carrier of illegal aliens.”52  The Court then 
prevented any further “individualized suspicion” advances, asserting: 
[T]he Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such 
suspicion [as] is clear from Camara v. Municipal Court . . . [where] the Court 
examined the government interests advanced to justify such routine intrusions 
“upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen” and 
concluded that under the circumstances the government interests outweighed 
those of the private citizen.53 
 
 47. Id. at 567. 
 48. Id. at 551-53. 
Permanent checkpoints . . . are maintained at or near intersections of important roads 
leading away from the border.  They operate on a coordinate basis designed to avoid 
circumvention by smugglers and others who transport the illegal aliens.  Temporary 
checkpoints, which operate like permanent ones, occasionally are established in other 
strategic locations.  Finally, roving patrols are maintained to supplement the checkpoint 
system. 
Id. at 552 (footnote omitted).  The Court focused on the permanent checkpoint in this case.  Id. at 
553. 
 49. Id. at 556. 
 50. See discussion supra note 37 concerning the inspection of one’s home. 
 51. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 556-58. 
 52. Id. at 557. 
 53. Id. at 560-61 (citations omitted). 
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The Court found it was justified in applying the Camara conclusion 
because it was dealing neither with “searches nor with the sanctity of private 
dwellings, ordinarily afforded the most stringent Fourth Amendment 
protection.”54  However, it also concluded that such a model was not on all 
fours with Martinez-Fuerte because the strong interests that justify a warrant 
were not present in this case.55  Specifically, the intrusion into one’s private 
dwelling justified the issuing of a warrant in Camara because the occupant had 
no way of knowing whether inspection of his premises was necessary to 
enforce the municipal code, no way of knowing the lawful limits of the 
inspector’s power to search and no way of knowing whether the inspector 
himself was properly authorized.56  On the other hand, the visible 
manifestations of the checkpoints in Martinez-Fuerte provide motorists with 
substantially the same assurances as the warrants in Camara.57 
The Court ultimately held that stops for brief questioning routinely 
conducted at permanent checkpoints did not violate the Fourth Amendment 
and did not require a warrant.58 Moreover, as checkpoint searches are 
constitutional only if justified by consent or probable cause, the Court limited 
Martinez-Fuerte to “the type of stops described in this opinion [and stated that] 
[a]ny further detention must be based on consent or probable cause.”59 
Between Martinez-Fuerte and the second leading roadblock case, the 
Court decided two fundamental cases, Delaware v. Prouse60 and Brown v. 
Texas.61  The Court suggested the possibility of another legitimate roadblock in 
Prouse, and in Brown, it set forth a three-part balancing test to determine the 
reasonableness of seizures.62 
In Prouse, a police officer observed marijuana in plain view in the 
defendant’s car during a routine stop to check for a valid driver’s license and 
vehicle registration.63  While it was agreed that states have a vital interest in 
ensuring that only qualified drivers are permitted on the road, the Court 
suppressed the narcotics because it was not convinced that the officer’s actions 
were necessary given the alternative mechanisms available to further the 
legitimate interest.64  The Court further found it troubling that no empirical 
 
 54. Id. at 561 (citation omitted). 
 55. Id. at 564-65. 
 56. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 565 (citing Camara, 387 U.S. at 532). 
 57. Id. at 565; Camara, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
 58. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 566. 
 59. Id. at 566-67. 
 60. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
 61. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). 
 62. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663; Brown, 443 U.S. at 50-51. 
 63. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 650-51. 
 64. Id. at 659-60.  Outside the traditional observation of traffic violations, Delaware also 
required that vehicles carry and display current license plates, evidence of proper registration, 
pass an annual safety inspection and be properly insured.  Id. at 660. 
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data existed to override the assumption that the “contribution to highway safety 
made by discretionary stops selected from among drivers generally [would] be 
marginal at best.”65  The Court concluded that stopping an automobile and 
detaining the driver in order to check his driver’s license and the registration of 
the automobile were unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, outside of 
having at least an articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is 
unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered.66  Nonetheless, this did not 
bar Delaware or any other State from “developing methods for spot checks that 
involve less intrusion or that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of 
discretion.  Questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops is one 
possible alternative.”67 
In Brown, the Court introduced what later became the “Brown Balancing 
Test.”  Here two police officers on patrol observed the appellant and another 
man walking in opposite directions in an alley that was known for high drug 
activity.68  Believing that the two men had previously been together, the 
officers stopped the appellant and asked for his identification because he 
“looked suspicious” and the officer had not previously seen him in the area.69  
The appellant refused the request, and the officer arrested him pursuant to a 
Texas statute which criminalizes a person’s “refuse[al] to give his name and 
address to an officer ‘who has lawfully stopped him and requested the 
information.’”70  After the Court held that enforcement of the statute violated 
the appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights, Justice Burger set forth a three-
pronged test to determine when a brief detention of a person is reasonable.71  
He stated that the constitutionality of a seizure depends upon “weighing . . . the 
gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the 
seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with 
individual liberty.”72  Further, this seizure “must be based on specific, 
objective facts indicating that society’s legitimate interest requires the seizure 
of the particular individual, or that the seizure must be carried out pursuant to a 
plan embodying the explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual 
officers.”73 
 
 65. Id. at 660.  The Court added that such a marginal contribution to roadway safety does not 
justify subjecting every vehicle to a roadside seizure.  Id. at 661. 
 66. Id. at 663. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 48-49 (1979). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 49 (footnote omitted). 
 71. Id. at 50-51. 
 72. Id. at 51. 
 73. Brown, 443 U.S. at 51 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979)). 
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2. Supreme Court Roadblock Case #2:  Michigan Department of State 
Police v. Sitz 
The second leading Supreme Court roadblock case is Michigan 
Department of State Police v. Sitz.74  In Sitz, the Court distinguished a previous 
line of cases75 and upheld the use of a sobriety checkpoint without the presence 
of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.76  Also known as DWI (Driving 
While Intoxicated) roadblocks,77 the site of these temporary checkpoints78 are 
usually determined by administrative officers based upon empirical data 
indicating that drunk drivers in a particular locale pose a safety problem to 
law-abiding drivers.79  Additionally, “[l]aw enforcement officials usually do 
not attempt to secure prior judicial approval for either the location of the 
roadblock or the conduct of the stops.”80  Prior to Sitz, many states, though not 
all, were striking down these sobriety roadblocks on constitutional grounds, 
finding injustice in allowing police to stop motorists for evidence of 
intoxication without individualized suspicion.81 
The Court asserted that the lower court, which previously ruled that this 
method was unconstitutional, erroneously analyzed the three-prong test from 
Brown to determine whether the brief detention of a person is reasonable.82  
Both courts found that the first prong was legitimately satisfied because drunk 
driving was recognized as a substantial state interest in Prouse,83 but found the 
third prong to be significant.  Although the objective intrusion (a twenty-five 
second delay) was minimal, the subjective intrusion was substantial because it 
had the potential to generate fear and surprise in “approaching motorists [who 
might not] be aware of their option to make U-turns or turnoffs to avoid the 
 
 74. 496 U.S. 444 (1990). 
 75. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Prouse, 440 U.S. 648; 
Brown, 443 U.S. 47.  In Brignoni-Ponce, roving border patrol agents were not justified to stop a 
vehicle solely on the ground that its passengers appeared to be of Mexican ancestry.  The Court 
held that roving agents may not detain a person in a vehicle even briefly for questioning in the 
absence of reasonable suspicion of illegal presence in the country.  Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 
876, 885-87.  See also DRESSLER, supra note 28, at 284.  For a discussion of Prouse and Brown, 
see supra notes 63-73 and accompanying text. 
 76. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444. 
 77. Treatise I, supra note 39, at 687. 
 78. See supra note 48 (distinguishing permanent, temporary and roving checkpoints). 
 79. Treatise I, supra note 39, at 688. 
 80. Id. 
 81. DRESSLER, supra note 28, at 286-87.  For further discussion of those cases that upheld 
DWI roadblocks, see Treatise I, supra note 39, at 689 n.95.  See also id. for those cases striking 
down DWI roadblocks. 
 82. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 445 (1990). 
 83. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text; Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451; Delaware v. Prouse, 
440 U.S. 648, 658-62 (1979); Treatise I, supra note 39, at 690. 
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checkpoints.”84  The Supreme Court, instead of comparing the intrusion to 
roving border patrols as the lower courts did, compared it to a fixed, brief stop 
at a checkpoint for illegal aliens, stating that the intrusion on motorists’ 
security was slight.85  As to the second prong, the lower court also said this 
was not met because the program did not sufficiently advance public interest.  
The Court held that the lower court’s reliance on the second prong to evaluate 
the “effectiveness” of the program was misplaced in that the passage was “not 
meant to transfer from politically accountable officials to the courts the 
decision as to which among reasonable alternative law enforcement techniques 
should be employed to deal with a serious public danger.”86 
The Court went on to distinguish Prouse, which also weighed the degree to 
which the seizures advanced public interest of highway safety, commenting 
that Prouse was totally void of any empirical data to support the advancement 
of such seizures.87  However, in Sitz the state provided actual statistics of the 
program’s effectiveness and further produced an expert witness to testify that 
sobriety checkpoints produced around a one percent arrest rate.88  It concluded 
that the balancing of the state’s interest in preventing drunk driving and the 
degree of intrusion upon the individual motorists who were stopped tipped the 
scales in favor of the state program, and it was therefore consistent with the 
Fourth Amendment.89 
Finally, Whren v. United States served to limit the Fourth Amendment 
prohibition against unreasonable seizures to an “objective” analysis.90  
Patrolling what was known as a high drug area of the District of Columbia, 
officers, in plainclothes and an unmarked car, pulled over a vehicle because of 
its suspicious behavior.91  The officers observed the vehicle’s “youthful 
 
 84. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452.  The lower court evinced this notion of generating fear and surprise 
from a similar condemnation of actions of the roving patrols in Brignoni-Ponce.  DRESSLER, 
supra note 28, at 288. 
 85. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451-53 (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S 543, 558 
(1976)). 
 86. Id. at 453. 
 87. Id. at 454-55.  Approximately 1.6 percent of the drivers that passed through the 
checkpoint were arrested for alcohol impairment.  Id. at 455.  An expert further testified that 
“experience in other States demonstrated that, on the whole, sobriety checkpoints resulted in 
drunken driving arrests of around 1 percent of all motorists stopped.”  Id.  The Court concluded 
that “this ‘record . . . provide[d] a rather complete picture of the effectiveness of the checkpoint’ 
and we sustained its constitutionality.”  Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455. On remand from the Supreme Court, however, the Michigan 
Supreme Court reinstated its original decision that the roadblock was unconstitutional, reasoning 
that seizures within the primary goal of enforcing the criminal law have generally required some 
essence of reasonable suspicion.  See Sitz v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 506 N.W.2d 209, 224-
25 (Mich. 1993). 
 90. 517 U.S. 806 (1986). 
 91. Id. at 808-09. 
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occupants waiting at a stop sign [and] the driver looking down into the lap of 
the passenger at his right.  [Having] remained stopped at the intersection for 
what seemed an unusually long time—more than twenty seconds—the 
[vehicle] turned suddenly to its right, without signaling, and sped off at an 
‘unreasonable’ speed.”92  Upon pulling the vehicle over and moving towards it, 
one officer immediately observed two bags in the petitioner’s hands, which 
appeared to contain crack cocaine, arrested the occupants and retrieved the 
narcotics.93 
Accepting the argument that the officers had probable cause to believe that 
a traffic violation had occurred, the petitioners argued that, in the realm of civil 
traffic violations, mere probable cause was not enough.94  They asserted that 
because total compliance with traffic codes is virtually impossible, it just 
opened the door for any officer “to catch any given motorist in a technical 
violation [thus] creat[ing] the temptation to use traffic stops as a means of 
investigating other law violations, as to which no probable cause or even 
articulable suspicion exists.”95 
Consequently, the petitioners asserted that the traditional Fourth 
Amendment test for traffic stops, based on probable cause, should be replaced 
by a more subjective test asking “whether a police officer, acting reasonably, 
would have made the stop for the reason given,” essentially preventing any 
type of pretextual stop. 96 
The Court, while agreeing that the Constitution prevented any sort of 
“selective enforcement of the law,” reminded the petitioners that the 
appropriate grounds for such an argument is the Equal Protection Clause and 
not the Fourth Amendment because “subjective intentions play no role in 
ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”97  The underlying basis 
 
 92. Id. at 808. 
 93. Id. at 808-09. 
 94. Id. at 810.  See also D.C. MUN. REGS. tit 18, § 2213.4 (1995) (District of Columbia 
traffic code) (“An operator shall . . . give full time and attention to the operation of the vehicle.”); 
§ 2204.3 (“No person shall turn any vehicle . . . without giving an appropriate signal.”); § 2200.3 
(“No person shall drive a vehicle . . . at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the 
conditions.”). 
 95. Whren, 517 U.S. at 810.  The petitioners, who were black, argued that such a loose 
probable cause standard allowed officers to stop motorists on the basis of “decidedly 
impermissible factors, such as the race of the car’s occupants.”  Id. 
 96. Id.  For petitioner’s cases supporting their position that the Court had disapproved 
pretextual stops, see id. at 811-12.  The Court responded to the petitioner’s cases by stating that 
they had never held, outside the context of inventory and administrative searches, that “an 
officer’s motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment; but 
[had] repeatedly held [to] the contrary.”  Id. at 812-13. 
 97. Id. at 813.  The Court seemed to probe into the petitioner’s proposed subjective test and 
found it nothing more than a roundabout way to “combat . . . the perceived ‘danger’ of the 
pretextual stop.”  Id. at 814.  The proposed test’s “whole purpose is to prevent the police from 
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for the gamut of Fourth Amendment cases is not to establish the subjective 
intent of individual officers—for then the petitioners’ argument of revealing 
subjective intent through objective means may work—but rather the principle 
basis is to allow certain actions to be taken under certain circumstances, 
regardless of subjective intent.98  Finally, the Court added that to apply the 
petitioners’ test would result in great difficulty because the actions of the 
“reasonable officer” vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and the protection of 
the Fourth Amendment should not be so inconsistent.99 
The Court concluded by noting that because the officers had probable 
cause to believe that a traffic violation had been committed, that rendered the 
stop reasonable per the Fourth Amendment and the evidence seized was 
therefore admissible.100 
II.  CIRCUIT SPLIT: THE LEGALITY OF PRETEXTUAL ROADBLOCKS—A 
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF BROWN V. TEXAS 
The majority in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, discussed below in Part 
III, placed notable emphasis on the primary purpose.  The dissent, however, 
maintained that the Brown Balancing Test should guide the Court.  While the 
Supreme Court’s decision is the controlling law, the circuit courts split on this 
issue, prior to Edmond, provided a relevant understanding into the perspectives 
of both the majority and the dissent. 
Courts have generally used Brown’s three-pronged test101 to determine the 
reasonableness of seizures, observing that such reasonableness must strike a 
“balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal 
security free from arbitrary inferences by law officers.”102  The question being 
when, if at all, the pretext of general law enforcement can be the basis for law 
officers seizing evidence of more serious crimes.  The only relevant Supreme 
Court roadblock case that has applied Brown is Sitz; however, Brown itself 
relied on both Martinez-Fuerte and Prouse in defining its scope. 
Brown noted that protecting individuals from the “unfettered discretion of 
officers,” is a central concern that is best met by requiring that a seizure be 
based on specific, objective facts indicating “society’s legitimate interest [in] 
the seizure of the particular individual, or that the seizure [is] carried out 
pursuant to a plan embodying explicit neutral limitations on the conduct of 
individual officers,” which is extracted both from Prouse and Martinez-
 
doing under the guise of enforcing the traffic code what they would like to do for different 
reasons.”  Id. 
 98. Id. at 814. 
 99. Id. at 815. 
 100. Whren, 517 U.S. at 819. 
 101. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text. 
 102. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979). 
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Fuerte.103  Finally, Sitz prompts that in considering the severity of the intrusion 
on individual liberty, the court must look both at the objective nature of the 
intrusion (duration of the stop and intensity of the inquiry) and its subjective 
intrusion (the potential to generate fear and surprise to law-abiding 
motorists).104 
Of greater merit, as evidenced by the majority opinion in Edmond, is the 
stated or underlying “purpose” for the checkpoint program.  Yet, as the dissent 
points out in Goldsmith II, the plain language of the Fourth Amendment does 
not lend itself to such an inquiry.105  In looking for the starting place for this 
contention, the search ended at United States v. McFayden.106  In McFayden, 
narcotics were discovered in the defendant’s automobile after it was stopped at 
a police traffic roadblock.107  The court found that the roadblock passed 
constitutional muster because it was “established to respond to identified 
problems of traffic congestion; it was designed to improve traffic enforcement 
in neighborhoods experiencing serious problems; [and] its principal purpose 
was to allow police to check for a driver’s license and vehicle registration 
[advancing] the legitimate governmental interests it was designed to serve.”108  
In the assessment of the legality of the roadblock, McFayden stated there was 
one additional factor that must be considered—whether “a roadblock 
purportedly established to check licenses could be located and conducted in 
such a way as to indicate that its principal purpose was the detection of crimes 
unrelated to licensing.”109  The Court went on to say that since the purpose of 
the roadblock, to check drivers’ licenses and car registrations, was legitimate, 
then officers were not required to close their eyes if in the process of their 
legitimate activities they found evidence of other crimes.110 
The cases finding these checkpoints “illegal”111 balanced the public 
interest and the right of the individual analysis by way of determining the 
primary purpose of the program, to satisfy the first factor of the Brown test.  
One court found the primary purpose to be related to “Operation Clean Sweep, 
 
 103. Id. at 51 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-55, 663 (1979); United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558-62 (1976)). 
 104. United States v. Huguenin, 154 F.3d 547, 552 (1998) (citing Mich. Dep’t of State Police 
v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990)). 
 105. See Goldsmith II, 183 F.3d 659, 667 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 106. 865 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 107. Id. at 1307. 
 108. Id. (emphasis added). 
 109. Id. at 1312 (citing 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.8(a), at 63-64 (2d ed. 1987)) [hereinafter Treatise II]. 
 110. Id. (citing United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 547 (10th Cir. 1985); Treatise II, supra 
note 109, at 64 n.58). 
 111. Galberth v. United States, 590 A.2d 990 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v. Morales-
Zamora, 974 F.2d 149 (1992); United States v. Huguenin, 154 F.3d 547, 552 (1998); Wilson v. 
Commonwealth, 509 S.E.2d 540 (1999); Goldsmith II, 183 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 1999). 
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violence, drugs and guns” and less related to traffic problems.112  Another 
court found the primary purpose was to detect narcotics, despite the alleged 
purpose of detecting drunk drivers, commenting that “[the state’s] actions 
[spoke] louder than [its] words.”113  Still another court had a very easy task in 
determining the primary purpose where the chief of police  “admitted that the 
‘primary goal,’ or ‘underlying purpose,’ of the roadblocks was to ‘look for 
drugs,’” even though he asserted that another reason was to check drivers’ 
licenses, vehicle registrations and proof of insurance.114  The Seventh Circuit 
in Goldsmith II also found that the primary purpose of the Indianapolis 
checkpoint, as conceded, was to catch drug offenders, aside from the fact that 
the police often discovered violations of traffic laws.115 
In sum, those courts finding that the primary purpose of the programs was 
to further general law enforcement purposes, as in the above cases, also found 
that individual suspicion must exist before a suspect could be seized or else the 
Fourth Amendment was violated.116  Where law enforcement established a 
checkpoint for a lawful purpose and performed an unlawful search for 
contraband during the stop, such a roadblock was pretextual, and any evidence 
obtained was tainted.117  Moreover, some courts expressly disagreed with the 
“mixed-motive” checkpoint theory, which held that the entire checkpoint was 
legitimate so long as one of the underlying purposes, no matter how minor, 
was lawful.118  No Court of Appeals has agreed with the “mixed-motive” 
analysis, but rather has upheld roadblocks only if the primary purpose was 
lawful.119 
These same cases relied a great deal on statistical and empirical data in 
determining the second factor of Brown, the degree to which the seizure 
advanced the public interest.  Similar to the Court distinguishing Prouse from 
Sitz based on the lack of empirical data in Prouse,120 the “illegal” cases 
computed a percentage based on the approximate number of cars stopped at the 
checkpoint, and the number of arrests made in relation to the focus of the 
program, and gauged that percentage as a level of effectiveness of the 
 
 112. Galberth, 590 A.2d at 997. 
 113. Huguenin, 154 F.3d at 555. 
 114. Morales-Zamora, 974 F.2d at 150. 
 115. Goldsmith II, 183 F.3d at 665. 
 116. Galberth, 590 A.2d at 998-99, 1001; Huguenin, 154 F.3d at 563 (citing Brown v. Texas, 
443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979)). 
 117. Morales-Zamora, 974 F.2d at 152-53.  “‘[T]here is nothing new in the realization that 
the Constitution sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in order to protect the privacy of us 
all.’  Like the rains from heaven, constitutional rights fall on the just and the unjust.”  Id. at 153 
(quoting Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987)). 
 118. Huguenin, 154 F.3d at 553-54.  This case refers to Merrett v. Moore, 58 F.3d 1547 (11th 
Cir. 1995), discussed infra notes 128-134 and accompanying text. 
 119. Huguenin, 154 F.3d at 554. 
 120. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
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checkpoint, often citing to the 1.6 percent approved in Sitz.121  In sum, if the 
government failed to produce enough or sufficient evidence to show that the 
very nature of its program advanced the public interest, the program was less 
likely to be upheld. 
Finally, the objective-subjective intrusion plays into Brown’s third factor—
how severe the interference is with individual liberty.  Here, the courts 
generally had little problem with the objective intrusion, as most of the stops 
were lasting no more than ten to fifteen seconds, up to two to three minutes.122  
Yet, the main concern seemed to come with the subjective intrusion—probing 
the elements of “fear and surprise” in the motorist.  Such an intrusion was high 
where the motorists felt 
that they [were] being singled out by random, roving-patrol stops, which 
frequently [took] place on seldom-traveled roads.  The fear and surprise [was] 
decreased if the stops [were] operated in a regularized manner, and if they 
“appear[ed] to and actually involve[d] less discretionary enforcement activity.” 
When the motorist could “see that other vehicles [were] being stopped [and 
could] see visible signs of the officer’s authority he [would be] much less 
likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion.”123 
The courts, in some of these cases, found the subjective intrusion to be 
substantial where: the roadblock was set up as a trap, tricking the motorist into 
thinking that the checkpoint was one-half or another mile down the road, but 
was actually located at the bottom of an exit ramp, where few people normally 
exit;124 there were no barriers, signs, traffic cones or other visible means of 
alerting motorist that they are approaching a checkpoint;125 and there were no 
 
 121. See, e.g., Huguenin, 154 F.3d at 559 (0.29% level of effectiveness); Wilson v. 
Commonwealth, 509 S.E.2d 540, 542 (1999) (stating that the Commonwealth needed to present 
some evidence establishing that “the method employed will be an effective tool for addressing the 
public concern involved” where security checkpoints were set up at the Hoffler Apartment 
Complex in response to resident complaints about trespassers and drug dealers on the premises); 
Galberth, 590 A.2d at 999.  There was no empirical data that the roadblock technique effectively 
promoted the government’s interest, as the Court found it was “common sense” that in an area 
that suddenly becomes “saturated” with police would effectively disrupt normal activity. Id.; 
Goldsmith II, 183 F.3d at 661-62 (mentioning briefly that the “hit rate” for Indianapolis’ program 
is 9%, but seeming to dismiss this fact, vying that court’s do not usually address reasonableness at 
the program level where general criminal law enforcement is the basis for the search.). 
 122. Cf. Huguenin, 154 F.3d at 560 (noting that the detention lasted several minutes which, 
while not objectively long, was still a great deal longer than those detentions that were less than 
thirty seconds and upheld in Sitz) with Galberth, 590 A.2d at 992.  The detention lasted for 
approximately two to three minutes, but the court did not comment on whether or not that was 
unusually long.  Id.  See also Goldsmith I, 38 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1019 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (typical 
stop lasts two to three minutes). 
 123. Huguenin, 154 F.3d at 560-61 (citations omitted). 
 124. Id. at 561.  The exit ramp was located in a secluded area, and there was no notice to the 
motorist regarding what was about to take place.  Id. 
 125. Galberth, 590 A.2d at 992; Huguenin, 154 F.3d at 561. 
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procedural guidelines established in how to approach the car.126  The holdings, 
in sum, were concerned with the primary purpose of the roadblock, finding 
them to either be one of general law enforcement or pretextual for the same 
and therefore unconstitutional. 
Under Brown, those cases finding the roadblocks to be “legal,” including 
the District Court in Goldsmith I,127 did not focus on the primary purpose of 
the checkpoints, but rather found merit in a dual-purpose.  They further 
determined the objective and subjective intrusions to be minimal, ultimately 
upholding the states’ actions.  The first factor, the state’s interests, was easily 
satisfied.  Even though the “primary” purpose of these checkpoints was to 
interdict drugs, these courts have adopted a mixed-motive approach,128 
allowing states to prohibit the flow of narcotics,129 where a license check, 
registration check or the like was also conducted.130 
As to the second factor, the effectiveness of the program in promoting the 
state’s interest, the courts again either found this was easily met, to the extent 
that the percentage rate was higher than the accepted 1.6% rate in Sitz, and 
0.5% accepted in Martinez-Fuerte,131 or instead determined that a program was 
 
 126. Cf. Huguenin, 154 F.3d at 561 (officer “just happened to be there when [defendants] 
came up”) with Galberth, 590 A.2d at 992 (Field Operations Bureau developed manual 
containing guidelines for each technique). 
 127. Merrett v. Moore, 58 F.3d 1547 (11th Cir. 1995); State v. Damask, 936 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. 
1996); Goldsmith I, 38 F. Supp. 2d 1016. 
 128. The Damask court noted that neither it nor the Supreme Court had addressed the specific 
question of a drug interdiction program being allowed to serve as the primary purpose for a 
checkpoint, but cited to cases that upheld a “dual-purpose” checkpoint.  936 S.W.2d at 572.  The 
Merrett court stated that where a state has one lawful, justifiable purpose in establishing the 
roadblock, such as checking driver’s license and vehicle registration, the additional purpose of 
controlling the flow of narcotics does not “render the roadblock unconstitutional.”  58 F.3d at 
1550-51.  See also State v. Everson, 474 N.W.2d 695, 701 (N.D. 1991) (holding that the safety 
inspection served as a legitimate state interest, even though the primary interest was to prohibit 
the flow of drugs). 
 129. See Goldsmith I, 38 F. Supp. 2d at 1022 (noting the government’s interest in interdicting 
narcotics is beyond serious dispute); Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 571 (“Drug trafficking has created a 
‘veritable national crisis in law enforcement’ and is ‘one of the greatest problems affecting the 
health and welfare of our population.’”) (quoting Nat’l Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 
U.S. 656, 668 (1989); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985)). 
 130. See Merrett, 58 F.3d at 1551.  The program advanced a sufficient state interest where it 
was to ensure compliance with the state driver’s license and vehicle registration laws.  Id. (citing 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657-58 (1979)). 
 131. See Merrett, 58 F.3d at 1551 (mentioning that the programs vehicle citation rate of 4.6% 
effectively advanced the state’s interest); Goldsmith I, 38 F. Supp. 2d at 1022-23.  The 
checkpoints resulted in fifty-five drug-related arrests out of 1,161 vehicles stopped, a ratio of 
4.7%.  Id. 
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“effective” even if the checkpoint was at least a reasonably effective tool in 
advancing the state’s interest, versus being the most effective means.132 
Concerning the final Brown factor, the level of intrusion, both subjective 
and objective, was found to be minimal, differing from the above cases where 
only the objective intrusion was found to be minimal.  In accord with the above 
cases, the objective intrusion was minimal where the stops were short in 
duration,133 but contrary to the above, the subjective intrusion was also found 
to be minimal.  The critical factors were whether the checkpoint adequately 
informed oncoming motorists of the stop, and whether the checkpoint was 
operated in such a way as to minimize officers’ boundless discretion in both 
their questioning and stopping of vehicles.134  The courts generally found that 
because specific plans and guidelines existed both prior to the actual 
checkpoint and during its on-scene operation, such as directing officers as to 
the amount and placement of signs, the number of officers to approach the 
 
 132. See Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 572 (commenting that whether a checkpoint is the most 
effective means of achieving the state’s interest is not dispositive.  “The courts need only decide 
whether, balanced with the importance of the governmental interest and the degree of intrusion, 
checkpoints are at least reasonably effective as a tool in advancing the government’s interest.”); 
Goldsmith I, 38 F. Supp. 2d at 1022 (noting that the choice among reasonable alternatives to 
achieve a particular state interest remains with “the governmental officials who have a unique 
understanding of [the] limited public resources.”); see also State v. Welch, 755 S.W.2d 624, 633 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (“[T]here is no necessity of numbers to establish the constitutional validity 
of such operations.”). 
 133. See Goldsmith I, 38 F. Supp. 2d at 1024 (commenting that the typical stop lasted two to 
three minutes); Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 574 (finding vehicles, on average, were stopped for no 
more than two minutes); Merrett, 58 F.3d at 1551 (holding nothing in the record indicated that 
any motorist was detained longer than reasonably necessary to check the driver’s license and 
registration). 
 134. See Goldsmith I, 38 F. Supp. 2d at 1023 (citing the critical factors as being first “whether 
it is set up in a manner which informs incoming motorists that this is an official stop and, 
secondly, whether it gives the officers conducting the stop unbridled discretion to randomly target 
individual motorists.”) (citing United States v. Trevino, 60 F.3d 333, 337 (7th Cir. 1995)); 
Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 574.  The critical factor is first whether the checkpoint is “planned and 
operated” in such a way that officer discretion is minimized.  Questions are asked concerning the 
prior planning and outside input, specific guidelines, adequate dissemination to field personnel, 
outside supervision, non-arbitrary reasons for choosing the checkpoint, and non-discretionary 
criteria in stopping vehicles, and second, the extent to which the stop might generate fear or 
concern on the part of the motorist.  Id.; see also Merrett, 58 F.3d at 1551-52. Because the state 
planner anticipated a possible delay for motorists, they instructed officers to wave cars through at 
the sign of congestion.  However, the officers on the scene did not adequately adhere to such 
instructions, and the court determined that this inquiry depends on “whether [the drivers] 
reasonably believed they were not free to turn around and to avoid the checkpoint.  The clock . . .  
begins to run when a reasonable person would believe he cannot leave the line and avoid the 
checkpoint.”  Id. (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980)). 
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vehicles and the type of questions to be asked, the subjective intrusion was 
minimal.135 
III.  CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS V. EDMOND: PRIMARY OR NOT PRIMARY—WHAT IS 
THE PURPOSE? 
A. Majority: Carving out a “Primary” Purpose Prong in the Fourth 
Amendment Analysis of Searches 
After stating the general rule that searches and seizures must be reasonable 
and stating those narrow situations where the usual rule does not apply,136 the 
Court, in a majority opinion led by Justice O’Conner, explained what had 
appeared to be the crucial factor in the leading roadblock cases: the primary 
purpose. 
In Martinez-Fuerte, where two immigration checkpoints were constructed 
on major United States highways, 100 miles from the Mexican border, the 
Court stated the significant factor in its decision was that the “balance tipped in 
favor of the Government’s interests in policing the Nation’s borders.”137  In 
Sitz, where a Michigan highway sobriety checkpoint program was established, 
the Court also held that 
[t]his checkpoint . . . was clearly aimed at reducing the immediate hazard 
posed by the presence of drunk drivers on the highways.  [Further], [t]he 
gravity of the drunk driving problem and the magnitude of the State’s interest 
in getting drunk drivers off the road weighed heavily in [the Court’s] 
determination that the program was constitutional.138 
Finally, in Prouse, though a spot-check of motorists driver’s licenses and 
vehicle registration was invalidated only because the officer’s conduct was 
unconstitutional,139 the Court “suggested that ‘[q]uestioning of all oncoming 
 
 135. See Goldsmith I, 38 F. Supp. 2d at 1023.  Motorists were informed of the dates of the 
checkpoint in advance, by virtue of the “massive law enforcement presence” as well as the 
coverage by the media.  Id.  In addition, the Indianapolis Police Department restricted a large 
amount of individual officer discretion with an on-scene supervisor, who was also bound by the 
official guidelines instituted by the Chief of Police.  Id.; Damask, 936 S.W.2d at 574-75.  The 
checkpoint was operated according to plans that existed about five months prior to the actual 
checkpoint operation, and the specific guidelines set forth in the plans limited officer discretion as 
to the actual operation and set up of the checkpoint.  Id.; Merrett, 58 F.3d at 1552 (reasoning that 
the reasonableness of the intrusion depends upon whether or not motorist reasonably believe that 
they are free to leave, the court comments that outside one recorded motorists that had a long 
delay, nothing else in the record indicates that motorists believed that they could not leave the 
line).  See supra note 134 (concerning a driver’s reasonable belief that they are free to leave). 
 136. See supra notes 13-17. 
 137. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 38 (2000). 
 138. Id. at 39. 
 139. The officer’s conduct was described as “standardless and unconstrained discretion.”  
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979). 
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traffic at roadblock-type stops’ would be a lawful means of serving the interest 
in highway safety.”140 
The Court noted that the common thread of “highway safety” ran through 
all of the cases, as distinguishable from a general interest in crime control.141  
Unlike the above cases, however, the State in the case at bar conceded its 
primary purpose for the checkpoint was to intercept illegal narcotics, yet the 
Court had never approved a checkpoint program whose primary purpose was 
to detect evidence of general criminal wrongdoing.142 
The State set forth several arguments that focused on the primary purpose, 
similar to those in Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz, to justify its checkpoint program.  
First, it proposed that it had the same ultimate purpose of “arresting those 
suspected of committing crimes.”143  Yet the Court quickly dismissed the 
argument, commenting that 
[i]f we were to rest the case at this high level of generality, there would be 
little check on the  ability of the authorities to construct roadblocks for almost 
any conceivable law enforcement purpose.  [And ultimately] the Fourth 
Amendment would do little to prevent such intrusions from becoming a routine 
part of American life.144 
Second, the State emphasized the severity of the drug problem, as a whole, 
to justify its program. 145  Again, the Court found no merit in this argument.  
Recognizing the social harm created by drug trafficking and the burden this 
illegal activity has placed upon law enforcement, the Court commented that 
similar qualms could be made of many other illegal activities.  It further added 
that the “gravity of the threat alone cannot be dispositive of questions 
concerning what means law enforcement officers may employ to pursue a 
given purpose.”146 
Third, the State attempted to analogize its own checkpoint to the “anti-
smuggling” purpose of the checkpoint in Martinez-Fuerte, in which the Court 
held the “traffic was too heavy to permit ‘particularized study of a given car 
that would enable it to be identified as a possible carrier of illegal aliens.’”147  
While the Court asserted that such logic is more apropos and forceful for the 
Indianapolis checkpoints, it also found that such logic prevails any time a 
vehicle “is employed to conceal contraband or other evidence of a crime,” and 
 
 140. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 39. 
 141. Id. at 40. 
 142. Id. at 40-41. 
 143. Id. at 41-42; United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545-50 (1976); Mich. Dep’t 
of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447, 450 (1990). 
 144. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 42. 
 147. Id. (citing Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557). 
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is therefore not comparable.148  Returning again to the predominate primary 
purpose argument, the Court once more pointed out that the primary purpose of 
the Indianapolis checkpoint was a general interest in crime control, and the 
fundamental requirement of individualized suspicion, save for some 
circumstances, should not be suspended in such situations.149 
Relying on Whren and Bond, the State next argued that such precedent 
precludes an inquiry into the “purpose” aspect of a checkpoint program, yet the 
Court found that these cases did not control the present case. 150  The Whren 
Court was faced with considering whether a temporary stop of a motorist based 
upon probable cause was inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment’s 
prohibition against unreasonable seizures, unless a reasonable officer would 
have been motivated to stop the car with the purpose of enforcing a traffic 
law.151  The Court, agreeing that selective enforcement was unconstitutional, 
and finding the proper basis for such an objection to be the Equal Protection 
Clause and not the Fourth Amendment, ultimately concluded that subjective 
intentions of officers play no role in the Fourth Amendment analysis.152  
Therefore, the Edmond Court found that while Whren precluded “subjective 
intentions” playing a role in the Fourth Amendment analysis, “Whren [did] not 
preclude an inquiry into programmatic purpose[s].”153  In Bond, the Court was 
faced with the question of whether an officer violated reasonable expectations 
while examining carry-on luggage in the overhead compartment of a bus.154  
 
 148. Id.  The Court noted that the Indianapolis checkpoint lacked the border context element 
that was crucial in Martinez-Fuerte.  Id.  It also stated that this “connection” to the roadway, 
asserted by the petitioner, is very different from the close connection to roadway safety presented 
in Sitz and Prouse.  Id. 
 149. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44.  “While we do not limit the purposes that may justify a 
checkpoint program to any rigid set of categories, we decline to approve a program whose 
primary purpose is ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control.”  Id. 
(footnote omitted). 
 150. Id. at 45.  See supra notes 20, 90-100 and accompanying text (discussing Whren and 
Bond). 
 151. Whren, 517 U.S. at 808. 
 152. Id. at 813; Edmond, 531 U.S. at 45. 
 153. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 45-46; Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.  For petitioner’s arguments in 
Whren, see supra notes 20-22. 
 154. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 335 (2000).  The petitioner was a passenger on a 
Greyhound bus which Agent Cantu boarded to check for immigrants.  Id.  Cantu squeezed the 
soft luggage passengers had brought on board that was placed in the overhead compartments.  Id.  
Cantu squeezed petitioner’s bag and felt a “brick-like” object in the bag.  Id. at 336.  The 
petitioner admitted the bag was his and allowed Cantu to open it.  Id.  Cantu discovered a brick of 
methamphetamine, and petitioner was indicted for conspiracy to possess, and possession with 
intent to distribute, methamphetamine.  Id.  The petitioner argued that Cantu conducted an illegal 
search of his bag.  Id.  While he “conceded that other passengers had access to his bag, [he] 
contended that Agent Cantu manipulated the bag in a way that other passengers would not.”  Id.  
It was undisputed that petitioner had a privacy interest in his bag, but “the Government assert[ed] 
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Again applying the principles set forth in Whren, the Bond Court reaffirmed 
the standard that subjective intentions of officers are irrelevant to such 
analysis.155  The Edmond Court went on to comment that because Bond was 
not an “ordinary probable-cause” analysis case, subjective intent was 
irrelevant, in that precedent required a focus on the “objective effects of the 
actions of an individual officer.”156  By contrast, cases concerning intrusions 
that occurred pursuant to a general scheme lacking individualized suspicion 
have often required an inquiry into purpose at the programmatic level. 
Finally, the State again argued that its checkpoint was justified by its 
lawful secondary purpose of keeping impaired drivers off the road and 
checking licenses and registration.157  Matter-of-factly, the Court appeared to 
place an exclamation point behind the primary purpose, remarking that giving 
merit to a secondary purpose justification would allow law enforcement 
authorities to establish checkpoints for virtually any purpose so long as a 
lawful check was attached, such as a license or sobriety check.158  In addition, 
the Court recognized that challenges may exist in positing a purpose inquiry, 
but held nonetheless that courts “routinely engage in this enterprise in many 
areas of constitutional jurisprudence as a means of sifting abusive 
governmental conduct from that which is lawful.”159  Moreover, despite the 
reasonableness inquiry being primarily objective under the Fourth 
Amendment, the special need and administrative exclusions demonstrated that 
purpose may be relevant in suspicionless intrusions pursuant to general 
schemes.160 
The Court concluded by reaffirming that its present holding did not alter 
the state of the approved checkpoints in Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz, nor the 
 
that by exposing his bag to the public, petitioner lost a reasonable expectation that his bag would 
not be physically manipulated.”  Id.  The Court asked first, “whether the individual, by his 
conduct, has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy; that is, whether he has shown that ‘he 
[sought] to preserve [something] as private.’  [And ] [s]econd . . . whether the individual’s 
expectation of privacy is ‘one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.’”  Id. at 338.  
The Court concluded that the petitioner intended to preserve the privacy of his bag by placing it 
directly above his seat, and although a bus passenger expects other passengers or employees to 
have to move the bag “for one reason or another . . . [h]e does not expect that other passengers or 
bus employees will . . . feel the bag in an exploratory manner.”  Id. at 338-39.  The Court held 
that Cantu’s “physical manipulation” of petitioner’s bag violated the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 
339. 
 155. Id. at 338 n.2. 
 156. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 46. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id.  Note that the Court’s emphasis on the primary purpose, as well as its seeming 
distaste to permit a valid secondary purpose, is in clear contrast to footnote 2 of its opinion.  See 
infra notes 190-193 and accompanying text (discussing further footnote 2). 
 159. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 46-47. 
 160. Id. 
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suggested lawful checkpoint in Prouse, yet such checkpoints must still balance 
the interests at stake and the effectiveness of the program.161  However, when 
general crime control objectives are sought, they must be justified by some 
“quantum of individualized suspicion.”162  Furthermore, the Court’s holding 
neither affected searches at airports or government buildings where “the need 
for such measures to ensure public safety can be particularly acute,”163 nor 
impaired the ability of officers to respond to information appropriately learned 
at a checkpoint justified by a lawful primary purpose.164  Finally, the Court 
reinstated the principle from Whren that the purpose inquiry is only to happen 
at the programmatic level and is not an invitation to probe the minds of 
individual officers at the scene.165 Because the State conceded what its primary 
purpose was, and the Court found it to be one of general crime control, lacking 
individualized suspicion, the State’s program violated the Fourth Amendment 
and the judgment of the Seventh Circuit was affirmed. 
B. Dissent: Keeping the Fourth Amendment Analysis “Objective” 
Justices Thomas and Scalia joined Justice Rehnquist’s dissent, where he 
stated that the Indianapolis’ checkpoint seizures served the State’s “accepted 
and significant” interest of protecting the highways from drunk drivers and 
verifying driver’s license and vehicle registration; and that there was nothing in 
the record indicating that the use of a drug-sniffing dog lengthened the 
seizures.166  Grounded in Brown, the dissent rested its opinion on two primary 
arguments: first, that the majority failed to apply the clear-cut analysis set forth 
by the leading roadblock cases, and second, that it added an unwarranted “non-
law-enforcement primary purpose” prong to the Fourth Amendment analysis. 
The crux of the dissent’s analysis centered on the “Brown Balancing Test.”  
A roadblock seizure is constitutional if it is 
carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the 
conduct of individual officers.  [There must be] a weighing of the gravity of 
the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure 
advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with 
individual liberty.167 
In both Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz, the Court balanced the State’s interest 
(illegal immigrants in Martinez-Fuerte; drunk driving in Sitz), against the 
objective intrusions (twenty-five seconds to five minutes) and the subjective 
 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 46-47. 
 165. Id. at 48.  See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. 
 166. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48.  Justice Thomas joined Part I of the dissent only. 
 167. Id. at 49 (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979)). 
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intrusion (minimal in both cases due to the standardized operations), and 
upheld both checkpoints as effective means of advancing the States’ interest.168 
Unlike the majority, which ultimately distinguished the Indianapolis 
checkpoint from those in Martinez-Fuerte, Sitz and Prouse by the primary 
purpose, the dissent found that the present checkpoint “follow[ed] naturally” 
from the leading cases.169  Regardless of the State conceding its primary 
purpose was to intercept the flow of illegal narcotics, the dissent asserted that 
based on the straightforward Fourth Amendment analysis, such a fact should 
not be controlling:170  “Even accepting the Court’s conclusion that the 
checkpoints at issue in Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz were not primarily related to 
criminal law enforcement, the question whether a law enforcement purpose 
could support a roadblock seizure is not presented in this case.”171  Applying 
Edmond to the first prong of the Brown test, the dissent pointed out that the 
secondary purpose for the Indianapolis checkpoint, checking for valid driver’s 
licenses’ and vehicle registrations, was expressly suggested in Prouse as being 
a justifiable and legitimate state interest, therefore it was irrelevant that the 
petitioners also hoped to intercept drugs.172  As to the second and third Brown 
prongs, the dissent found that the seizure was objectively reasonable, lasting 
only two to three minutes, and subjectively reasonable, as the intrusion was 
limited by clearly marked checkpoints and uniformed officers with specific 
guidelines.173  The only difference then, the dissent noted, was that the present 
case involved the presence of a dog; however, it had previously been held that 
a “sniff test” by a trained narcotics dog did not rise to the level of a search 
under the Fourth Amendment.174  The dissent’s Fourth Amendment analysis 
 
 168. Id. at 50. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 50 (footnote omitted). 
 172. Goldsmith I, 38 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1026 (S.D. Ind. 1998); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 
648, 663 (1979); Edmond, 531 U.S. at 51.  “Once the constitutional requirements for a particular 
seizure are satisfied, the subjective expectations of those responsible for it are irrelevant.  Because 
the objective intrusion of a valid seizure does not turn upon anyone’s subjective thoughts, neither 
should our constitutional analysis.”  Edmond, 531 U.S. at 52.  The dissent relied on Whren, where 
the Court held that an officer’s subjective intent would not invalidate an otherwise objective and 
justifiable vehicle stop.  Id. at 51-52; Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1986).  The 
reasonableness of the vehicle stop in Whren turned on whether there was probable cause to 
believe that a traffic law had been violated, and similarly the reasonableness of highway 
checkpoints, in the case at bar, turns on whether such checkpoints serve a legitimate state interest 
with minimal intrusion.  Edmond, 531 U.S. at 51-52.  Just as the Whren stops were found to be 
objectively reasonable, “so too the roadblocks here are objectively reasonable because they serve 
the substantial interests of preventing drunken driving and checking for drivers license and 
vehicle registrations with minimal intrusions on motorists.” Id. 
 173. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 51-53. 
 174. Id. at 52.  For a discussion of a dog “sniff” in Place, see supra note 28-29.  A dog “sniff” 
does not rise to the level of a search because the protection of the Fourth Amendment “protects 
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concluded by mentioning the Indianapolis checkpoint success rate—forty-nine 
arrests for offenses unrelated to drugs, emphasizing the fact that the State did 
have a legitimate interest outside of narcotics, and therefore the stops should be 
constitutional.175 
Lastly, the dissent contended the majority added an unwarranted “non-law-
enforcement primary purpose” prong to its Fourth Amendment analysis, a 
scrutiny more appropriate in the area of searches, but not “brief roadblock 
seizures.”176  The purpose prong that the Court found so “indispensable” had 
previously been rejected because “seizures of automobiles ‘deal neither with 
searches nor with the sanctity of private dwellings, ordinarily afforded the 
most stringent Fourth Amendment protection.’”177  The latter represents what 
is termed the “special needs” doctrine, permitting limited intrusions to search a 
person’s body and home, “[however] there [are] no such intrusions here.”178  
The dissent argued that the traditional privacy and freedom the Fourth 
Amendment protects in searches is significantly different from one’s 
expectation of privacy in an automobile, because automobiles are “subjected to 
pervasive and continuing governmental regulation and controls.”179  As a 
result, the lowered expectation of privacy, along with the minimal intrusion, 
equals a brief, standardized, non-intrusive seizure, and one which cannot be 
compared to the intrusive search of the body or home.180  The dissent 
compared the “special needs” inquiry, which serves to both define and limit the 
permissible scope of those searches, with the Brown balancing test, defining 
and limiting the permissible scope of automobile seizures, and concluded that 
the additional purpose prong was both unnecessary to ensure Fourth 
 
people from unreasonable government intrusions into their legitimate expectations of privacy.”  
Place, 462 U.S. at 706-07.  The information obtained through the investigative technique of a 
dog’s sniff is “much less intrusive than a typical search,” and does not subject the owner of the 
property to the “embarrassment [or] inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and more 
intrusive investigative methods.”  Id. at 707. 
 175. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 53. 
 176. Id.  The dissent cites Martinez-Fuerte, where the Court consistently looked at “the scope 
of the stop” in examining a program’s constitutionality.  Id.  See United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 567 (1976). 
 177. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 54 (citing Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 561).  The dissent pointed 
to the respondents in Sitz who argued that Brown was not the proper analysis to use for roadblock 
seizure cases.  Id. at 53.  In Sitz the Court held that it was “perfectly plain” from Von Raab, 
referring to Martinez-Fuerte, that Von Raab was “in no way designed to repudiate our prior cases 
dealing with police stops of motorists on public highways.”  Id.  Martinez-Fuerte and Brown are 
the relevant authorities.  Id.; see Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 449-50 (1990). 
 178. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 54. 
 179. Id. (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976)). 
 180. Id. 
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Amendment rights and was bound to produce mass confusion as to the 
“purpose” of a particular seizure.181 
Justice Thomas did not join Part II of the dissent, proposing that Martinez-
Fuerte and Sitz were decided incorrectly.  He stated, “I rather doubt that the 
Framers of the Fourth Amendment would have considered ‘reasonable’ a 
program of indiscriminate stops of individuals not suspected of 
wrongdoing.”182  He added, however, that because respondents failed to 
propose the overruling of these leading cases, he would refrain from 
considering such an argument.183 
C. Author’s Analysis: Strong Start . . . But A Weak Finish for the Majority 
The majority is to be commended for its holding in that it serves to protect 
the privacy rights of every motorist on the road, preventing innocent 
individuals from being subjected to checkpoints at the whim of law 
enforcement.  Even though the Court has previously expressed that the privacy 
rights of innocent individuals will at times be invaded, it has also noted that 
such an invasion generally is supported by at least some notion of suspicion.184  
However, while the holding appears valid for policy reasons, the Court’s 
analysis appears unsound when one examines the relevant precedent. 
First, after drawing the line of validity at checkpoints established for 
general criminal law enforcement purposes, the line begins to thin at what is 
considered protecting society and pure general criminal enforcement.  The 
Court used the former reason to uphold the state’s actions in Martinez-Fuerte 
and Sitz, and the latter to strike down the present checkpoint.  Yet, as the 
dissent pointed out, prohibiting the flow of illegal drugs into the country 
undoubtedly serves to protect society, both young and old.  The Court seems to 
use Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz to lay the foundation as to what valid “primary 
purposes” are; even still, while the transportation of illegal aliens and sobriety 
checks are relevant, the more pressing issue is why the Court upheld them.  It 
may be argued that the cases were not upheld because the interests presented 
were the primary purpose, but rather because the state’s interests were 
legitimate and pressing.  While immigration issues and drunk driving are 
present concerns, there can be no doubt that drugs in this country is, too, a 
viable concern that must haunt every law enforcement agency in the country.  
As portrayed by the media, drugs are everywhere; from the oldest citizen to the 
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 182. Id. at 56. 
 183. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 56. 
 184. The Seventh Circuit in Goldsmith II identified at least four situations in which the 
innocent individual may be intruded upon where there is a basis for law enforcement to believe 
that a particular search or seizure, distinct from a random or general search or seizure, will yield 
evidence of a crime. Goldsmith II, 183 F.3d 659, 666 (7th Cir. 1999). 
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youngest child on the playground, and the urgency of police departments in 
trying to combat this enemy any way they know how can be understood, or at 
minimum, should be a sufficient and legitimate enough interest to stand on its 
own without conforming to Martinez-Fuerte or Sitz.  However, as stated 
above, in combating this war on drugs, every citizen driving a car should not 
be subjected to the efforts of the law enforcement in controlling the enemy.  
There must be limits, boundaries and guidelines. 
Second, as both the majority and dissent cite Whren as standing for the 
proposition that the subjective intentions of officers do not play a role in the 
Fourth Amendment analysis, the majority is correct in asserting that Whren 
does not preclude inquiry into the purpose of a checkpoint.  Yet, it is unclear 
how this crucial “primary” factor became concrete, or justified by precedent.  
Regarding Martinez-Fuerte, Sitz and Prouse, the majority states: 
[E]ach of the checkpoint programs that [it has] approved [were] designed 
primarily to serve purposes closely related to the problems of policing the 
border or the necessity of ensuring roadway safety.  Because the primary 
purpose of the Indianapolis narcotics checkpoint program is to uncover 
evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing, the program contravenes the Fourth 
Amendment.185 
In fact, though the word “primary” is not even mentioned in Martinez-
Fuerte,186 and only brought up in a footnote in Sitz during the testimony of the 
commander of the Michigan State Police Department concerning his purpose 
in effectuating the checkpoint program, this was not relied upon by the 
Court.187 
The Court began to unravel the legitimacy of Indianapolis checkpoint 
simply because each of the other programs it had upheld dealt with problems 
“closely related” to policing the border and ensuring roadway safety.  Yet the 
reality of the situation is that there have only been two cases, decided in 1976 
and 1990, concerning the types of checkpoints which are legitimate.  It seems 
unreasonable that in the year 2001, an age where one of the most pressing 
concerns facing our society is illegal narcotics, this problem could not be 
 
 185. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41-42. 
 186. The word “sole” precedes “purpose” in one context where the Court is analyzing the 
subjective intrusion on motorists.  Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 560.  The defendants arrested 
suggested that they were stigmatized by being referred to the secondary inspection area, but the 
Court stated that the defendants overstated the consequences. 
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residence status that cannot feasibly be made of every motorist where the traffic is heavy.  
Moreover, selective referrals rather than questioning the occupants of every car tend to 
advance some Fourth Amendment interests by minimizing the intrusion on the general 
motoring public. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 187. See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 470-72 n.13 (1990). 
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considered “closely related” to the primary purposes in the leading cases.188  
Consequently, the State has the stronger argument as to how the checkpoints at 
issue can be reconciled with Martinez-Fuerte.  While drivers “high” on drugs 
may not be a grave concern, compared to the drunk drivers in Sitz, it might be 
argued that it is relatively well-known that most drugs are smuggled into the 
country, resembling Martinez-Fuerte.  As for Whren, it is not clear whether the 
Court is ingenious or unwise for contending that because inquiry was irrelevant 
only to the subjective intentions of the officer, inquiry into the programmatic 
purpose is allowed.189  The ingenuity comes if the Court was attempting to find 
any way to strike down the checkpoint, but the imprudence is revealed if 
Whren’s openness is later used to justify the Court creating further limitations 
to vehicle checkpoints. 
Finally, in what is perhaps the most damaging part of the Court’s opinion, 
the constant focus upon the newfound “primary” purpose analysis leaves the 
door wide open for an influx of cases where states have set up checkpoints that 
have a “secondary” purpose to, for example, stop the flow of illegal narcotics.  
Almost acknowledging that this “door” has been left open, the Court maintains 
in footnote 2: 
[W]e need not decide whether the State may establish a checkpoint program 
with the primary purpose of checking licenses or driver sobriety and a 
secondary purpose of interdicting narcotics.  Specifically, we express no view 
on the question whether police may expand the scope of a license or sobriety 
checkpoint seizure in order to detect the presence of drugs in a stopped car.190 
The questions that this “primary” purpose analysis has left are: 1) what 
constitutes a “primary” purpose and who is to determine that, and 2) what 
becomes of the projected footnote, where the secondary purpose of a 
checkpoint program is to prevent the flow of narcotics, and the primary 
purpose is to check for driver’s license and the like? 
The problem presented in the first inquiry is that undoubtedly states are in 
the best position to determine what is primary for them, and while the courts 
acknowledge this, it is debatable that in the end, the determination of what 
constitutes a primary purpose will be left up to the courts.191  While the 
determination may depend upon what has been held in other jurisdictions to be 
primary; it may ultimately go back to Sitz, Martinez-Fuerte and Prouse, a 
worthwhile, but restricting and non-evolving view of present state concerns.  It 
 
 188. The Court recognized the national policy of the United States to limit the increase of 
immigration in Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 551.  It further recognized the magnitude of drunken 
driving problem in Sitz, 496 U.S. at 449, 451. 
 189. See supra notes 90-100 and accompanying text (discussing Whren). 
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 191. See generally Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453-54 (stating that the choice among reasonable 
alternatives for effectuating state interests is best left in hands of that state as they have a unique 
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is perfectly logical to conclude or at least purport that a roadblock is not the 
most effective means of combating drugs, because the accident rate between 
drugs and driving is probably nowhere near the caliber of drinking and driving, 
but who is to say that in a city whose biggest problem is illegal drugs, many 
vehicle accidents are not caused by such, that that purpose is not primary?  If a 
state claims eliminating illegal drugs is a legitimate interest, and it can produce 
empirical data supporting its proposition, why should any court be allowed to 
step in and say such an interest is essentially invalid to support a checkpoint 
because it is one of general criminal law enforcement, where no individualized 
suspicion exists? 
As to the second inquiry, this evidences the fact that the Court has gotten 
itself into a dilemma by stressing what is the primary purpose.  So what of the 
checkpoint that makes interdicting drugs its secondary purpose, but conducts 
sobriety checks as its “primary” purpose?  Simple.  States will begin instituting 
lawful and justifiable checkpoints all over the place to achieve the underlying 
means of intercepting drugs or any other substance they deem to be a 
legitimate state interest.192  Actually, it is not even clear if the secondary 
purpose has to be legitimate at all.  As to those courts that adopted this “mixed-
motive” approach, they are the realistic consequences of the majority’s 
opinion—that virtually any and every type of checkpoint will be upheld, 
boundaries will be nonexistent and the power given to law enforcement will be 
unstoppable.  If that is the end that the majority seeks to achieve, then it has 
done so with this primary purpose.  To put it another way, if the majority’s 
goal was to give law enforcement some power to be able to attack this war on 
drugs, then it has done so rather creatively, without upsetting the controlling 
precedent.  But if its goal was to prevent law enforcement from being able to 
set up a checkpoint for any reason, absent individualized suspicion, upsetting 
the Fourth Amendment, then it has failed. 
Perhaps a better way to achieve the latter would have been to eliminate the 
use of the word primary altogether and assert that the only purpose for such 
suspicionless checkpoints, save for the recognized exclusions, must be one of a 
legitimate state interest that is not bent on “catching the bad guy,” but 
furthering the safety and welfare of society.  But again, it may be difficult to 
argue that controlling the flow of illegal drugs does not fit into this category.  
Note that this revision does not take power away from officers to be able to 
seize drugs they do find, but such seizure would have to happen the old fashion 
way, the way the Framers intended, based upon probable cause. 
In addition, eliminating the use of the narcotics dog at the initial stop might 
solve the underlying problem.  The need for a narcotics dog in the airport, and 
governmental buildings has been settled as valid, but according to the Court, 
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the same need does not exist at checkpoints.  The rational is that the use of a 
narcotics dog is for one purpose only, to find drugs.  If the Court deems that 
such an action is not lawful without individualized suspicion, then officers 
should not use the dogs until such probable cause, and the need for the dog, 
arises.  This may ensure that checkpoints are set up for reasons the Court finds 
lawful and justifiable, and still give officers the tools to be able to combat 
drugs.  For example, if a car is stopped according to a preceding plan and 
specific guidelines, for a legitimate reason, and during the stop the officer has 
reasonable suspicion to believe that the vehicle may be carrying drugs; they 
may then bring the dog out to sniff the car.  Even though Place asserts that a 
dog “sniff” does not rise to the level of a “search” for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment,193 allowing the dog to sniff the car simultaneous with the officer 
checking for drugs contradicts the very essence of the Court’s opinion; 
undermining the evil it is trying to prevent—giving unbridled power and 
discretion to police in the area of general criminal enforcement of the law.  It is 
not suggested that Place was decided incorrectly, but if the Court wishes to 
enforce its viewpoint that interdicting drugs requires individualized suspicion, 
then as Place pertains to roadblocks, it should be reevaluated. 
As for the dissent, while the checkpoint at issue should not be allowed 
more for policy reasons than anything else, the merit of its opinion is pointed 
out in the majority errors. 
First, the dissent presents the better argument that the present case follows 
naturally from the two leading roadblock cases and Brown.  The majority does 
not even mention the “Brown Balancing Test” in its own analysis—the 
straightforward constitutional test, the very foundation of which establishes the 
reasonableness of a checkpoint program.  The framework set out from these 
cases only requires inquiry into the state’s interest, the effectiveness of the 
program in advancing that state interest and the intrusion imposed upon the 
motorists. 
The state interests in Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz, illegal aliens and drunk 
driving, were considered grave, and the flow of illegal narcotics has equally 
been found to be a grave concern for the States.  Prong one is satisfied.  Next, 
turning to the effectiveness of the checkpoint, there is no argument that the 
effectiveness of the Indianapolis checkpoint surpassed those percentages that 
were upheld in Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz.  Prong two is satisfied.  Finally, the 
level of intrusion, evaluated on both an objective and subjective level, is where 
the greatest differences lay between the conflicting circuits that have heard this 
issue.  The objective intrusion was generally found to be minimal, but the cases 
striking down the checkpoints found the subjective intrusion to be great.  Had 
the majority analyzed Brown, it would have been unable to successfully rely 
upon the same data because those conclusions seemed to be solely based upon 
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a handful of cases whose checkpoints were set up in a way to “trick” the 
motorists into the vehicle stop,194 but in both Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz and the 
present case, the checkpoints were clearly marked, guidelines clearly 
established and protocol clearly followed to avoid officer discretion.  Prong 
three is satisfied. 
As the dissent recognized, the only difference between the leading cases 
and the present one is the presence of a dog, but so long as the Court holds that 
a dog “sniff” does not constitute a search for which individualized suspicion 
would be required, and a dog is allowed to be present at legitimate and 
justifiable checkpoints, then the checkpoint passes the Court’s own Brown test. 
Second, though a proper argument advanced by the dissent was that the 
present case did not require asking the question of whether a law enforcement 
purpose could support a roadblock seizure, the more paramount argument is 
that the Fourth Amendment analysis appropriate for seizures does not speak to 
primary purpose.195  Such language is not present in Martinez-Fuerte, Sitz or 
Whren.  Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz were upheld because of the valid reasons for 
conducting the roadblock seizures; and Whren, which the majority interpreted 
as leaving open an inquiry into the programmatic purpose of a checkpoint, was 
seen by both the majority and dissent as precluding the subjective intentions of 
an officer from being introduced in the Fourth Amendment analysis.  
Therefore, if the former two cases stand for the proposition that legitimate state 
interests can support a roadblock seizure, and drug trafficking is considered 
such an interest; and if Whren’s proposition is valid, that the subjective 
intentions of the officers hoping to interdict drugs is irrelevant, then the present 
checkpoint was sufficient to warrant a roadblock.  There is no mention of 
primary purpose. 
Moreover, the dissent correctly cited those cases where the majority looked 
to the purpose of the state’s actions,196 and those cases concerned the searches 
of one’s home or business where the intrusion involved was great because the 
expectation of privacy was so high.  However, in the case at bar, it has been 
repeatedly noted that expectation of privacy in one’s automobile is 
significantly different than the above. 
Finally, there may be some validity in Justice Thomas’s implication that 
Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz were decided incorrectly.  His assertion that the 
Framers might not have approved of the application of the Fourth 
Amendment—a tenet that affords every citizen a blanket of protection from 
unreasonable intrusion into their persons or home—being diminished to a test 
of reasonableness has some force behind it.  Since its inception, the Fourth 
Amendment has been a measure of security for the average citizen to have 
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some control over the government, and to take that away because the seizure is 
deemed reasonable seems to be yet another blow in the citizen’s shield.  An 
additional argument may be advanced that the two cases were decided without 
due consideration as to how and where the boundaries and limits would be 
drawn in determining what types of interest would be considered legitimate—
such as whether or not all subsequent cases would have to be analogized in 
accord with the leading cases, or if the cases simply represent two examples of 
legitimate interests.  The majority seems to want to enforce the former,197 but it 
seems illogical that the interests of fifty states should be forced to conform to 
only two choices, created twenty-four and ten years ago, respectively. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
A new twist on a previous scenario, City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 
presented the Court with a great challenge—balancing the privacy rights of its 
citizens with the necessary job functions of our law enforcement.  For valuable 
policy reasons, the holding of the majority is the correct one.  The line has to 
be drawn somewhere preventing even the most valiant of law enforcement 
objectives from intruding upon the rights of innocent individuals without the 
pre-requisite probable cause.  However, the route the majority took to reach its 
conclusion is unsettling because it does not appear to be in line with the 
controlling precedent. 
The Fourth Amendment deems all searches and seizures unreasonable 
without individualized suspicion except for the limited exclusions.  The 
vehicular roadblock exclusion requires that the checkpoint be of a legitimate 
public interest and reasonable, and through Martinez-Fuerte and Brown, the 
constitutional test for reasonableness developed.  Yet, in this latest opinion, as 
pointed out by the dissent, the majority does not even mention the Brown test, 
but instead carves out a new crucial factor, primary purpose, a factor that has 
never before been an essential element in seizure cases.  The implication of 
this primary purpose factor, which is essential in search cases, and now finds 
its way into the seizure cases, leaves wide open the door for law enforcement 
to satisfy the primary prong by one of the interests already upheld, and then 
have a secondary purpose be whatever it wishes, such as interdicting illegal 
narcotics. 
The effects of this implication may be twofold: if the evil the Court tried to 
prevent with its opinion was an unbridled discretion of law enforcement to 
intrude upon the public, its goal was undermined because the secondary 
purpose was left to the discretion of the police.  However if emphasis of the 
“primary” purpose was simply to not upset the controlling precedent, and hint 
that a secondary purpose may still be used to effectuate a state’s program, then 
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the Court has, in a roundabout way, creatively kept the power in the hands of 
law enforcement.  Regardless of its intent, the Court’s silence as to the 
constitutional test fashioned for these types of cases remains curiously 
questionable, because strict application of Brown lends itself to an arguable 
finding that the Indianapolis checkpoint should have been upheld. 
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